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Abstract
Safeguard is a system that aims to improve the dependability and survivability of large complex
critical infrastructures by using distributed autonomous agents to monitor and protect them. This
paper describes the embedding of a workﬂow management system within one of the Safeguard
agents to support real-time correlation of information from anomaly detectors, intrusion detection
systems and other system monitors. The workﬂow management system interprets workﬂow models,
which are represented by augmented Petri Nets modelling generic forms of attack or failure. The
workﬂow management system also triggers appropriate responses automatically according to the
reasoning results of Bayesian networks linked to transitions in the workﬂows. A case study example
from the management of electricity distribution networks will be presented.
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1 Introduction
Large Complex Critical Infrastructures (LCCIs) play a key role in modern
life, providing services such as telecommunications, electricity, gas and water
within and between countries. In recent years, far-reaching changes has been
1 Email: john.bigham@elec.qmul.ac.uk
2 Email: xuan.jin@elec.qmul.ac.uk
3 Email: david.gamez@elec.qmul.ac.uk
4 Email: chris.phillips@elec.qmul.ac.uk
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 121 (2005) 87–99
1571-0661 © 2005 Elsevier B.V. 
www.elsevier.com/locate/entcs
doi:10.1016/j.entcs.2004.10.009
Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license. 
made on these infrastructures such as increased dependence on IP networks,
increased import and export of electrical power and increased use of renewable
energy supplies. These infrastructures are now highly interconnected and
interdependent. This has made them more vulnerable to attacks, failures
and accidents. Any malfunction in these infrastructures can cause serious
international cascading failures. For example, in August 2003 the Blaster
worm infected about 400,000 systems, six days later the Welchia (or Nachi)
worm even infected Air Canada’s check-in system and the US Navy and Marine
Corps computers. On the very next day, the fast spreading Sobig.F worm
reportedly produced over 100,000 copies of itself within the ﬁrst 24 hours.
Later this worm accounted for one in every 17 emails at its peak [1]. The
high speed worm consumed a great deal of bandwidth, making the network
congested and unstable. Another example is the cascading electrical power
failure that happened in September 2003 when storm-tossed tree branch hit a
Swiss transmission line and this caused another transmission line to overload
and knock out French energy transmission to Italy. Detection and defence
against attacks and failures in LCCIs is a ﬁeld of study in which there are no
silver bullets. This is due to the sheer size and diversity of attack and failure
types. Correlation is an eﬀective solution that combines distributed detection
and response with integration of critical information from many sources.
Safeguard is a system that aims to enhance the dependability and surviv-
ability of LCCIs [2]. At present the availability and integrity of critical infras-
tructures are usually mainly monitored and maintained by human operators.
Intrusion detection software has already been deployed in many LCCIs to help
human operators monitor the system. However currently these software gen-
erate too many false positive and false negative alerts. Human operators are
often overwhelmed when bursts of alerts arrive or misled by the wrong alert
reports. More seriously, cascading alerts and failures can be aggravated when
the operator cannot make decisions and act promptly. Safeguard uses agents
to monitor and protect LCCIs by improving the capabilities of the automatic
control functions and also helping human operators to make the right deci-
sions and the right time. In Safeguard, the objective of its correlation agent is
to make sense of diverse pieces of information and perform timely action. It
correlates alerts in real-time from multiple heterogeneous detection systems.
This paper describes the use of Petri-net modelled workﬂows to support cor-
relation and monitoring of associated actions. Firstly a review of the main
agents in the Safeguard system is given, followed by a description of the cor-
relation agent in more details. A case study of the use of the correlation agent
is then given.
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2 Safeguard Agent System
2.1 Overview
The Safeguard agent system is implemented as a hierarchically layered agent
system. It combines distributed detection and distributed response with in-
tegration of critical information from many sources. The Safeguard agent
system has hybrid detector agents that monitor the operators, system com-
ponents and system malfunction detectors within an infrastructure in order
to assess the state of the system and if it contains erroneous data or under
attack. Problems within the system, such as anomalous data or ﬁle integrity
violations, will be identiﬁed. This information can be either passed to the op-
erator or automatically acted upon, in order to prevent or limit inappropriate
behaviour. The most important agents will now be covered in more detail.
2.2 Hybrid Detector Agents
The Hybrid detector agents (HDAs) are eﬀectively sensors that are used to
gather information about diverse aspects of the system. Typically, their role
does not exceed passive monitoring, although some may perform certain ac-
tions on the managed system, but only if explicitly permitted by the action
agent. HDAs combine known information with a dynamic model of the sys-
tem’s normal behaviour. A large number of diﬀerent types of dedicated agents
are placed in the system to monitor many aspects of system activity. Examples
of HDAs are:
(i) a keystroke anomaly detector agent, which examines the keystroke pat-
terns of the diﬀerent operators. Signiﬁcant anomalies in an operator’s
keyboard patterns could indicate that someone else is using their termi-
nal or password;
(ii) an electricity data anomaly detector that examines data from the remote
terminal units and checks if previously established relationships hold in
the current data;
(iii) another electricity anomaly detector that looks at time diﬀerences in func-
tions called when responding to well known commands from the control
centre.
Because many of the HDAs in Safeguard are based on constructing diﬀerent
models of normality or deﬁning invariants or approximate invariants in the
system, they are capable of detecting anomalies that have not occurred before.
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2.3 Wrapper Agents
The Wrapper Agents are attached to the existing intrusion detection systems
that gather information about the system and possible attacks on the system.
Wrapper agents simply allow information from existing diagnostic and IDS
components can be integrated within the Safeguard system. Information from
wrapper agents is sent to the correlation agents. An example is ﬁle integrity
checker wrapper agent, which monitors integrity violations on critical system
ﬁles.
2.4 Workﬂow Correlation Agents and Action Agents
The Workﬂow Correlation agents (WCAs) contain an embedded workﬂow
management system. Predeﬁned workﬂow models for the managed network
are loaded to the workﬂow management system. Transitions of these workﬂow
models are associated with predeﬁned Bayesian network models. Workﬂow
correlation agents are responsible for integrating information from the diﬀer-
ent HDAs or wrapper agents and reasoning about the state of the network and
behaviour of operators. Some of these transitions are used to model actions
or to communicate with a separate action agent. In this way the correlation
and action agents work together to provide a quick response that rectiﬁes
problems as they arise. An example of available responses includes changing
ﬁrewall policies when a worm is reported by the WCAs to stop the propagation
of the worm in the network.
2.5 Man Machine Interface Agent
The Man Machine Interface (MMI) agent is used to manage the agents and
deﬁne the scope of their legitimate activity. However the MMI agent is not
the interface the operator uses to control the system.
2.6 Functioning of the Agent System
The architecture of the agent system and the system being monitored is given
in Fig. 1 Diﬀerent hybrid detector agents are positioned in the system based on
the type of the activity they are monitoring. Information from these is passed
on to the correlation agent, which makes an assessment of the trustworthiness
of actors and data from the system components. Based on this, the privileges
of the operators or topology of the system is modiﬁed over time by the action
agent with the authorisation of the administrator operating through the man
machine interface agent.
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Fig. 1. System monitoring through agent interaction
3 Hybrid Workﬂow and Bayesian Network Correlation
3.1 Workﬂow Overview
Workﬂows are deﬁned by the Workﬂow Management Coalition as follows:
”The automation of a business process, in whole or part, during which doc-
uments, information or tasks are passed from one participant to another for
action, according to a set of procedural rules” [3]. They have been used in
business for a number of years to model the ﬂow of information within an
organisation and the operations carried out on that information. These appli-
cations are oriented towards managing a complex sequence of activities.
3.2 Petri Net Modelled Workﬂow
W.M.P. van der Aalst [4] has described Petri Nets as a tool for modelling work-
ﬂows and describes modelling with sequential activities, parallel activities,
AND splits, OR splits (implicit and explicit), diﬀerent joins and iteration. 5
This paper also describes standard ways that transitions in the workﬂow are
triggered: Automatic, User, Message, and Time. In our research, we follow
the terminology and notation of van der Aalst.
5 A full explanation of explicit OR-split and implicit OR-split is available at page 20, [4]
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3.3 Workﬂow Management System
Workﬂow management systems are used to deﬁne, manage and execute work-
ﬂows using software whose order of execution is driven by a computer rep-
resentation of the workﬂow logic [5]. There are many commercial and non-
commercial workﬂow management tools available such as Cosa [6] and Open-
WFE [7]. Each application provides diﬀerent functionalities and serves dif-
ferent users. In our research we chose the Bossa Workﬂow System [8] as our
workﬂow management system because it has the following advantages:
(i) Bossa uses augmented Petri Nets to provide an intuitive way of modelling
workﬂows and a way to verify workﬂow correctness. Extended Petri Nets
even allow users to model time and include a hierarchy of workﬂow mod-
els.
(ii) Bossa is designed to be embedded and it is easy to deﬁne and dynamically
load workﬂows in Bossa.
(iii) Bossa is written in Java, which can be platform independent. Also it is
relatively easy to integrate Bossa with other Java code linked to workﬂow
functions
(iv) Bossa is lightweight and fast. One reason is because tracking of position
in a workﬂow is implemented without using separate threads for each
workﬂow. This allows the agent to deal with a large number of diﬀerent
workﬂows relating to diﬀerent event sequences in the monitored system.
3.4 Constructing Workﬂows
Basic Petri Net modeled workﬂows for Bossa workﬂow management system
have the following elements: Places, Transitions, and weighted Arcs. Work-
ﬂows in our system can only be started at one point. This point should be
marked by placing a single token at that point. Four diﬀerent types of transi-
tion can be used to construct a workﬂow. The transition type is set using the
ﬁrst few letters of its name.
Bayesian controlled transitions
These transitions are ﬁred when the probability of the node in the Bayesian
network identiﬁed as corresponding to the transition exceeds the prescribed
threshold.
Message sending transitions
When a workﬂow reaches a message sending transition a message is sent to
another agent. For example, a message sending transition can send a message
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Fig. 2. Typical Petri Net modeled workﬂow
to the MMI agent with the subject ’WorkﬂowStarted’. The attributes of the
workﬂow will also be sent to the receiving agent when the transition ﬁres. It
is also possible for the agent to send a message to itself. This feature can be
used to start a workﬂow or set an observable in another workﬂow.
Timer Transition
A timer transition either sets a timer or checks to see if the timer has
expired. Timer transition can be used to execute periodic tasks.
Ordinary transitions
An ordinary transition is used to route the workﬂow based on static or dy-
namic attributes. These transitions are always ﬁreable when they are reached
by the workﬂow.
A simple Petri Net modeled workﬂow using our interface to the Bossa
workﬂow engine is shown as Fig. 2 Transition T1 has an explicit OR-split.
Variable a is global to the particular workﬂow but invisible to other workﬂows.
When transition T1 is ﬁred, according the evaluation results of the post-
conditions of T1, the token in place P0 will be transferred to P1 or P2.
3.5 Constructing Bayesian Networks
Bayesian networks are constructed in an XML format using the graphical
capabilities of the JavaBayes software [9]. The EBayes software [16] is em-
bedded in the correlation agent and this is used when updating the beliefs
of nodes in the Bayesian networks that are linked to transitions in the work-
ﬂow. A Bayesian network provides a link between incoming messages from
anomaly detectors and a transition in the workﬂow. Each Bayesian network
contains one or more observable nodes which corresponding to incoming mes-
sages. Observables are linked by the Bayesian network to nodes associated
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Fig. 3. Typical Bayesian network structure
with workﬂow transitions. The belief in the Bayesian network node linked
with this associated Petri net transition node is queried to see if the transition
should ﬁre at runtime. Deterministic relationships between observables and
transitions are handled as a degenerate case where the probabilities are 0 and
1. Observable nodes do not depend upon any other Bayesian network nodes
as they are set directly by other agents of Safeguard system. Fig. 3 shows
the structure. A tree structure is not required; the network can be an acyclic
graph.
3.6 Hybrid Workﬂow and Bayesian Network Correlation
In our research we are applying workﬂows to model and monitor both normal
and abnormal ﬂow of activities within an organisation (such as a power plant or
a telecommunication carrier) and the operators working in the control centre
and repair facilities. It is understood that many of the workﬂows are not
already in place. Messages from the diﬀerent anomaly detectors are ”pushed”
to the correlation agent. Each of them has a value of true or false, which will
be used to set observable nodes in the Bayesian networks in the appropriate
workﬂows. (This could be generalized so that probabilities could be passed,
but it is not so in the current implementation.) When repeated messages are
sent the latest incoming message will update the corresponding observable
node to it new value. These messages are stored by the correlation agent so
that it can retrieve attributes of the message when a transition ﬁres. By doing
so we are able to correlate diﬀerent reports and alerts from diﬀerent intrusion
detection agents at diﬀerent times and stages of evolution of an attack.
A simple and abstract Bayesian network controlled workﬂow is shown as
Fig. 4 (In section 4, a concrete case study of workﬂow correlation will be
illustrated.) Transition T1 has an explicit OR-split and it is associated with
J. Bigham et al. / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 121 (2005) 87–9994
Bayesian network B1. Incoming messages from diﬀerent anomaly detectors
update the observable nodes in B1. Bayesian network will work out the proba-
bility of proposition B Transition1. If the probability exceeds a certain thresh-
old, transition T1 will ﬁre. Then the token in place Place0 will be transferred
to the corresponding place according to the value of the attribute a. Attribute
a is an internal variable that is maintained by the workﬂow engine. Its value
can be changed by messages from other agents. This routing continues until
the end of workﬂow is reached.
Fig. 4. Workﬂow controlled by Bayesian network
There can be hundreds of predeﬁned workﬂow types existing in a single
correlation agent and for each workﬂow type there could be many instances
of this workﬂow running simultaneously. The Bossa workﬂow management
system handles the concurrency and parallel execution.
4 Correlation Case Study
In this scenario a worm enters the electricity control centre’s local area network
and starts to scan and copy itself onto other machines. The Safeguard hybrid
detector agents and wrapper agents detect some of the consequences, such
as network congestion, scanning, and ﬁle modiﬁcations. This information is
passed to the correlation agent.
Two families of worm were emulated for test purposes, namely Code Red
and Slammer. Only the latter is reported here. Slammer uses UDP for its
propagation and sends a single infection packet to a randomly chosen IP ad-
dress. To control the propagation rate, the range from which this random IP
address is chosen can be set using a command line argument. The impact of
the worm emulation upon the electricity network and the Safeguard response
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were measured by using Network Probe to monitor the total network traﬃc.
The worm emulation was initially run without Safeguard and then with Safe-
guard so that the eﬀectiveness of the Safeguard response could be evaluated.
In the Safeguard tests, a string was included inside the worm and a signature
written for Prelude IDS to test the ability of Safeguard to respond to a known
worm. Safeguard was also tested without Prelude to evaluate the ability to
detect and respond to an unknown worm on the network. All the tests were
run with a single vulnerable process running on one machine and a single
malicious process on a second machine.
A set of workﬂows correspond to mechanisms to detect an unknown worm
were constructed. The workﬂow shown in Fig. 5 is one of them. The node
circled is an example of a node that is triggered by an associated network,
which is not shown. This node is ﬁred when there is some indication, though
not certainty, of a worm attack. Other activities are used for waiting and
sending messages to the MMI agent.
Linked workﬂows relate to monitoring patterns of behaviour of a suspected
attacking host and another that is initialized for each suspected victim ma-
chine. These are initialized on the ﬁrst indications and then they build up
evidence of attacker or victim. All the workﬂows are within the correlation
agent and run simultaneously. In Fig. 6 the output of a network probe is
shown. Normal traﬃc on the electrical network was around 1Mbit/sec. The
Slammer traﬃc led to an increase in traﬃc and the rapid detection of the
worm, but in this case it took some time for the killing messages from the
Safeguard system to get through so that the recent worm processes could be
eliminated.
5 Conclusion and Future Work
A prototype system for enhancing the survivability and dependability of large
scale infrastructures is being constructed and is being evaluated on two im-
portant kinds of critical infrastructure, namely electricity distribution and
the management of a telecommunications network. Instances of all the main
agents of the system have been constructed. Current work is on implement-
ing the test beds for the electricity and telecommunications domains and on
evaluating the techniques developed.
This paper has concentrated on an aspect of our approach to correlation.
By correlation is meant the synthesis of information from diverse kinds of
anomaly detector and IDS and making sense of this information. Information
is synthesized for patterns of attack that can extend over a period of time.
The time events occur can matter. For example, a scan in itself may not be
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Fig. 5. Worm detection and elimination workﬂow
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Fig. 6. A worm attack on the network and the eﬀect on the traﬃc
signiﬁcant, but in the context of a suspected kind of attack it can give sup-
porting or contradictory evidence. An example of a successful use of workﬂows
has been indicated
One important aspect of the approach not described here is the creation
of a variety of anomaly detectors that detect deviations from normality. The
system is trained under normal operation and then deviations from normality
are detected. This is how the system can initially detect new kinds of attack.
Work ﬂows are used in an attempt to go a little further. For patterns of
attack that have been analysed then a framework for conﬁrmation and action
is provided by the workﬂows. Action and synthesis of information can be
intertwined.
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